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TAX FAIRNESS BY CONVENTION: A DEFENSE OF HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
 
By 
 
Ira K. Lindsay* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Horizontal equity is the principle that people who 
earn equal income should owe equal tax. It has gotten a bad 
name. Although horizontal equity remains a textbook 
criterion of tax fairness, scholarly literature is largely hostile. 
Scholars ranging from the legal theorist Louis Kaplow to 
philosophers Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy question its 
conceptual coherence and normative significance. The crux 
of the case against horizontal equity is that it seems irrational 
to worry about the relationship between pre-tax income and 
tax obligations rather than determining tax policy in light of 
what our best theory of distributive justice tells us is the best 
post-tax outcome. I argue that horizontal equity is best 
understood as a compromise principle for people who 
disagree about deeper principles of distributive justice. The 
debate over horizontal equity reflects two distinct ways of 
thinking about fairness. One approach starts with principles 
that specify a just distribution of income, resources or utility 
and uses these principles to derive appropriate tax laws. A 
second approach analyzes fairness norms as stable and 
mutually advantageous compromises between people who 
                                                     
*  Postdoctoral Fellow, Dartmouth College, Political Economy Project 
and Department of Philosophy. I am grateful to Prof. Scott Hershovitz, Prof. Reuven 
Avi-Yonah, Prof. James Hines and Will Thomas of Michigan Law School, Prof. John 
A. Miller of the University of Idaho College of Law, Prof. Robert Ellickson and Prof. 
Daniel Markovits of Yale Law School, Prof. Peter Railton, Prof. Elizabeth Anderson, 
Prof. Allan Gibbard, Prof. Sarah Buss, Charles Sebens, Annette Bryson, Robin Zheng, 
Chloe Armstrong, Nils Hennes-Stear, Paul Boswell, Jeremy Lent of the University of 
Michigan, Prof. Max Cherem of Kalamazoo College and participants in the 2015 
Michigan Law Young Scholars conference for guidance, comments, suggestions and 
criticisms. 
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have conflicting interests and differing moral commitments. 
Proponents and opponents of redistributive taxation can 
agree that at any given level of redistribution they will each 
be better off if taxes are horizontally equitable. Horizontally 
equitable taxation can thus prevent rent-seeking and 
ideological conflict over tax policy from generating a wasteful 
patchwork of narrow taxes and tax subsidies. Observing 
horizontal equity may be unimportant when people agree on 
ideal principles of justice and the relevant empirical facts. But 
under more usual conditions of deep moral and empirical 
disagreement over tax policy, treating pre-tax income as a 
normative baseline can prevent conflict over distributive 
questions from leading to wasteful and inequitable tax policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Horizontal equity has a peculiar status. Although horizontal equity is 
a textbook criterion of tax fairness,1 in the years since Louis Kaplow and 
Richard Musgrave’s debate over horizontal equity,2 the weight of scholarly 
opinion seems squarely against it.3 Horizontal equity is the principle that 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 27–28 (5th ed. 2005); see also JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 533–34 (2011); LAURIE L. MALMAN, LINDA F. SUGIN, 
LEWIS D. SOLOMON, & JEROME M. HESCH, THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES, 
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 14–15 (2002). 
2. Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 
42 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 139–54 (1989) [hereinafter Kaplow, Horizontal Equity 
Measures]; see Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX 
J. 113, 113–22 (1990); see also Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. 
TAX REV. 191, 191–96 (1992); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further 
Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354, 354–59 (1993). 
3. E.g., Kaplow, Horizontal Equity Measures, supra note 2, at 139–50; see 
also James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135, 
2016] Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity 81 
taxpayers who are positioned identically relative to the tax base should pay 
equal tax. For example, under an income tax regime, if A and B have the same 
income they should owe the same amount of tax.4 Vertical equity concerns the 
way in which tax obligations vary in proportion to income. As a corollary to 
my case for horizontal equity, I will defend a minimalist principle of vertical 
equity that requires only that taxpayers with higher income should owe more 
tax in absolute terms than taxpayers with lower income such that if A has a 
greater income than B, A will owe more income tax than B.5 Horizontal equity 
has a peculiar status. It is an intuitively appealing principle and, despite the 
weight of recent criticism, still figures prominently in discussions about public 
                                                     
139–42 (2012) [hereinafter Repetti & Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited]; Jeffrey H. 
Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and 
Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 645–92 (2006); David Elkins, Horizontal 
Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 43–90 (2006); Paul 
R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal Equity and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA TAX REV. 607, 607–22 (1993); Leslie Green, 
Concepts of Equity in Taxation, in FAIRNESS IN TAXATION: EXPLORING THE 
PRINCIPLES 87, 89–93 (Allan M. Maslove ed., 1993). 
4. The terms horizontal equity and vertical equity were coined by Richard 
Musgrave over half a century ago. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF 
PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 159 (1959). I explain horizontal 
equity and vertical equity in the context of income taxation for ease of exposition. A 
more precise formulation would describe horizontal equity in terms of equal treatment 
of individuals who are identically positioned relative to the tax base. The tax base 
might be specified in terms of wealth or consumption rather than income. Horizontal 
equity under a consumption tax regime would require that taxpayers with equal levels 
of consumption owe equal tax and under a wealth tax would require that taxpayers 
with equal wealth holdings owe equal amounts of tax. Alternately, one might define 
horizontal equity in terms of utility such that a horizontally equitable tax leaves 
individuals with equal pre-tax utility with equal post-tax utility. See Martin Feldstein, 
Compensation in Tax Reform, 29 NAT’L TAX J. 123, 124 (1976) [hereinafter Feldstein, 
Compensation in Tax Reform]. 
5. This principle of vertical equity is quite permissive. It is compatible 
with progressive, proportionate or even regressive tax rates. It is only violated in 
situations in which Taxpayer A realizes more income than Taxpayer B, but B owes 
more in tax than A does. More stringent principles of vertical equity are possible as 
well. For example, one could require that wealthier taxpayers pay at least as high a 
percentage of their income in tax as poorer taxpayers do. Because I aim to show that 
principles of tax fairness can play a useful role in structuring bargains between people 
with differing views about distributive justice, I have chosen a principle of vertical 
equity designed to be as innocuous as possible. I do not mean to imply that more 
restrictive principles of vertical equity are not also justified. I take no position on that 
question. 
82 Florida Tax Review  [Vol. 19:2  
 
finance.6 Attention to horizontal equity is sometimes justified by the 
observation that, regardless of what the experts think, people do appear to care 
about it.7   Why they ought to do so is often left unaddressed.8   Tax theorists,  
  
                                                     
6. I will focus primarily on horizontal equity because this is the more 
difficult principle to justify. If my argument in favor of it succeeds, the same reasoning 
can be used to support the minimal principle of vertical equity. Other arguments, 
however, are required to justify more ambitious principles of vertical equity. These 
are less likely to depend on the sort of conventional fairness principles appealed to in 
this Article and thus the justification, if any, of more ambitious principles of vertical 
equity is beyond the scope of this Article. 
7. For example, Emmanuel Saez recently responded to Greg Mankiew’s 
facetious proposal to tax height as a proxy for earning power by appealing to popular 
sentiment in favor of horizontal equity: 
 
Concerns for horizontal equity impose constraints on the optimal tax 
problem. The public would not accept a tax on height because it 
would seem unfair to tax more a taller person than a shorter person 
with exactly the same economic means. However, the public fully 
accepts that taxes should be based on income, which measures 
economic welfare or need closely, with the idea that it is less painful 
for a rich person than for a poor person to give up $1. Therefore 
studying the constrained utilitarian problem using a tax based solely 
on income and not based on extraneous characteristics such as 
height makes the most sense and can usefully inform the tax policy 
debate. That’s what economists have done (including myself) since 
the famous contribution of James Mirrlees in 1971. 
 
I’d recommend Greg develops a model explaining why people care 
about horizontal equity -- that’d be a useful contribution. 
 
Conor Clarke, Taxing Height: Emmanuel Saez Responds to Mankiew, THE ATLANTIC, 
May 29, 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/05/taxing-height-
emmanuel-saez-responds-to-mankiw/18486/; see also STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, TAX 
FAIRNESS AND FOLK JUSTICE 195 (2013). Martin Feldstein begins a classic article on 
horizontal equity by noting that: 
 
The principle of horizontal equity is not a mere abstraction of 
academic theory but a fundamental belief that is widely held and 
strongly felt. Many otherwise desirable tax reforms may never be 
enacted because doing so would violate this injunction that 
government action should not treat equals unequally. It is important 
therefore to seek ways to eliminate or reduces such horizontal 
inequities. 
 
Feldstein, Compensation in Tax Reform, supra note 4, at 128. 
2016] Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity 83 
economists, and political philosophers have put forward powerful arguments 
that the principle of horizontal equity is misconceived. Thomas Nagel and 
Liam Murphy contend that attention to horizontal equity is just one 
manifestation of what they call the “myth of ownership”—the view that pretax 
income is of independent normative significance.9 Louis Kaplow argues that 
it is unreasonable to set tax policy according to fairness principles such as 
horizontal equity since they are unjustified if they fail to maximize welfare, 
and beside the point if they do happen to coincide with welfare maximizing 
policies.10 The crux of the case against horizontal and vertical equity is that it 
seems irrational to worry about the relationship between pre-tax income and 
tax obligations rather than determining tax policy in light of what the best 
outcome is all things considered. For example, utilitarians argue that tax law 
should maximize aggregate welfare whereas Rawlsians believe that taxes 
should be set in accordance with the difference principle. On either theory, it 
is of no real significance whether taxes turn out to be horizontally or vertically 
equitable because how tax obligations compare to pre-tax income has no 
intrinsic significance. 
In this Article, I will give a new account of why horizontal equity is 
important. In doing so, however, I will suggest that its role is orthogonal to 
utilitarian policy analysis of the sort preferred by Louis Kaplow and 
comprehensive theories of distributive justice of the sort defended by Murphy 
and Nagel. I argue that horizontal equity is best understood as a compromise 
principle for people who disagree about the justice of redistributive taxation. 
Horizontal equity requires a sort of procedural fairness in allocating 
obligations to contribute to public goods in accordance with pre-tax holdings. 
It is valuable because it serves to constrain parties who may wish to use the 
tax system to gain at the expense of their fellow citizens and limits the extent 
to which distributions of wealth that have been fixed by private law may be 
                                                     
8. LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
397 (2008) [hereinafter KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS]. 
 
Why should a one-util shortfall to individual I count more than some 
other one-util shortfall to the same individual I because the former 
is classified as one particular form of inequity? The literature does 
not attempt to answer this basic question or, relatedly, indicate why 
a distinct measure of horizontal inequality is required in the first 
instance. 
 
Id. 
9. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES 
AND JUSTICE 37–39 (2002) [hereinafter MURPHY & NAGEL, MYTH OF OWNERSHIP]. 
10. KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 
8, at 396–401. 
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unsettled by public law. Proponents and opponents of redistributive taxation 
can agree that at any given level of redistribution, they will each be better off 
if taxes are horizontally equitable. Tax equity norms can thus prevent conflict 
over tax policy from generating a wasteful patchwork of narrow taxes and tax 
subsidies. They also can structure tax reform bargains in which people with 
ideological disagreements agree to reduce tax rates while expanding the tax 
base. 
Tax equity norms would be unnecessary if people agreed on principles 
of justice and the relevant empirical facts. This explains why scholars who 
offer comprehensive normative theories of taxation tend not to give tax equity 
principles a significant role in their systems. Their criticisms of horizontal 
equity are often convincing when considered in the context of a unified ideal 
theory of fair taxation.11 However, when there is moral and empirical 
disagreement over tax policy, horizontal equity has a valuable role to play. 
This account of tax equity illustrates the usefulness of conventional norms of 
fairness and explains the normative significance of pre-tax income in a way 
that does not rely upon “natural property rights” or pre-institutional moral 
desert. 
I will first explain several powerful arguments against tax equity 
principles. Next, I distinguish several ways of thinking about distributive 
fairness. Whereas prominent critics embrace a top-down theory of distributive 
fairness that evaluates taxes insofar as they contribute to a fully specified 
system of distributive justice, a bottom-up approach to tax fairness starts with 
pre-tax entitlements and then applies fairness principles that can be agreed 
upon by people with a range of normative commitments. I use this conception 
of fairness to defend horizontal and vertical equity. Rather than being an ideal 
                                                     
11. The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theories of justice is the 
subject of a large and ever growing literature. The terms “ideal” and “non-ideal” are 
defined variously and sometimes inconsistently throughout it. For the purposes of this 
Article, I take John Rawls’s theory of justice to be a prototype of ideal theory and non-
ideal theory to depart from it in two crucial respects. First, ideal theory is concerned 
with the principles of distributive justice that would be best to implement if people 
were able to agree on common principles of justice (or, alternatively, if supporters of 
the correct principles of distributive justice were able to impose them by fiat). Non-
ideal theory, by contrast, is concerned with situations in which people disagree about 
principles of justice (e.g., some people are Rawlsian and others are neo-Lockeans) and 
political institutions are not necessarily regulated by a single united theory. Second, 
ideal theory supposes that people are usually motivated to comply with principles of 
justice whereas non-ideal theory does not assume that people are sufficiently 
motivated to comply with principles of justice merely by virtue of their moral 
correctness. This is not, of course, to say that people are never intrinsically motivated 
to act justly, but merely to expand the scope of motivational considerations that must 
be taken into account. 
2016] Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity 85 
principle of tax justice, horizontal equity is a fairness norm useful for 
structuring compromises between people who disagree about ideal principles 
of tax justice or about the empirical consequences of tax policy. After outlining 
my positive case for tax equity, I respond to objections that tax equity 
principles are vacuous because they do not rule out any plausible policies or 
ineffectual because they make no practical difference. 
 
II. THE CASE AGAINST TAX EQUITY 
 
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel in The Myth of Ownership and Louis 
Kaplow in numerous articles over the past several decades advance related 
criticisms of horizontal equity from different normative perspectives. Murphy 
and Nagel argue that tax fairness principles such as horizontal and vertical 
equity are symptomatic of conceptual confusion about the relationship 
between property rights and tax obligations. They aim to refute what they call 
“everyday libertarianism”—the view that people have a prima facie moral 
claim to their pretax income and that justice in taxation should therefore be 
evaluated according to a baseline of pre-tax income or holdings.12 Murphy and 
Nagel argue that because market outcomes have no independent moral 
significance, there is no reason to evaluate taxes in relation to pretax income 
or wealth. Tax laws should instead be evaluated according to whether they 
bring about results sanctioned by our best theory of distributive justice. 
Property entitlements and associated tax obligations are just insofar as they are 
part of a system that achieves post-tax results endorsed by principles of justice 
and unjust insofar as they are not. Since post-tax outcomes are the appropriate 
objects of moral evaluation, evaluation of tax policies against a baseline of 
pre-tax holdings is misconceived in that it adopts a baseline that has no special 
normative status. For this reason, Murphy and Nagel reject the principle of 
horizontal equity as an empty formalism that distracts from the truly important 
questions of tax fairness. And they reject claims that “tax discrimination” as 
such can be unfair unless it is done on the basis of some independently 
problematic ground such as race, sex, religion, or national origin.13 So, for 
example, “[t]here would be nothing unfair . . . in a tax on chocolate ice cream 
but not on vanilla, though it would be arbitrary.”14 Nor is there anything unfair 
about similarly arbitrary deductions and tax credits. A just tax regime might 
end up being horizontally equitable. But, according to Murphy and Nagel, this 
would be mere coincidence: tax regimes are just insofar as they bring about 
post-tax distributions that are just. Whether these results bear any particular 
relation to pre-tax income is of no import. 
                                                     
12. MURPHY & NAGEL, MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 9, at 38–39. 
13. Id. at 170–72. 
14. Id. at 170. 
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Murphy and Nagel reason as follows: Property rights are conventional 
in the sense that they do not track pre-institutional moral rights. Principles of 
distributive justice determine which distributions of property are just and 
which are unjust. Each citizen’s access to and control over social resources is 
determined by the concurrent effect of rules of private law, taxation, and 
government spending. In a just political order, a citizen’s morally legitimate 
property claims are determined by the combined results of these policies. For 
this reason, it makes little sense to talk of just property laws or just tax laws or 
just transfer payments in isolation. Supporters of different theories of 
distributive justice will have different views on which systems of property 
rights, tax obligations, and government programs are just. Utilitarians will 
support rules that maximize aggregate welfare.15 Rawlsians support rules that 
maximize the “primary goods” available to the least advantaged segment of 
society.16 A wide range of other principles of distributive justice are possible 
as well. Because taxes are a necessary element of the system of rules that 
determines legitimate property entitlements, “there are no property rights 
antecedent to the tax structure.”17 A person’s moral entitlement to property 
under a fully specified legal regime depends both on her pre-tax holdings and 
on her tax obligations (as well as various other points of private and public 
law). Because a person is only morally entitled to their post-tax income under 
a just economic system and post-tax income depends on both private law and 
tax law, nobody has any moral claim to their pre-tax income. And because pre-
tax income has no independent moral significance, there is no legitimate 
ground for complaints (outside of certain forms of invidious discrimination, 
for example, on grounds of race) that a particular tax improperly favors one 
group or another by treating those with similar pre-tax incomes differently. 
For this reason, criteria of tax fairness, such as horizontal and vertical equity, 
that use pre-tax income as a normative baseline are entirely vacuous. 
Murphy and Nagel are egalitarians with views on distributive justice 
similar to, but not identical with, those of John Rawls.18 In any case, their 
approach to distributive justice is typical of contemporary post-Rawlsian 
political philosophy. They argue that the justification of rules of taxation is 
systemic in that it depends on the entire system of property entitlements and 
tax obligations and teleological in that it is based on the resulting pattern of 
post-tax income and not sensitive to the ways in which pre-tax income 
                                                     
15. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE 24–28 (2002) [hereinafter KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VS. WELFARE]. 
16. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54–56 (rev. ed. 1999). 
17. MURPHY & NAGEL, MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 9, at 74. 
18. Murphy and Nagel do not commit themselves to particular principles of 
distributive justice in The Myth of Ownership and may not agree with each other about 
all of the particulars. 
2016] Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity 87 
translates into post-tax income. The basic contours of their argument, 
however, should appeal to all those who do not endorse a fairly strong theory 
of natural rights according to which people have a pre-institutional moral 
entitlement to their property and income earned through their labor.19 It is an 
argument that might, with small modifications, be endorsed by utilitarians and 
others who disagree with Murphy and Nagel about the correct theory of 
distributive justice. As such it provides a particularly difficult challenge to tax 
equity.20 
                                                     
19. Natural rights theories of property might suggest that systemic 
justification of tax obligations is not necessary either because pre-tax income reflects 
property rights that are justified by moral desert or because the state has acquired a 
moral obligation to defend these rights when the property owner entered the social 
contract. I do not favor natural rights theories of property for reasons that are tangential 
to the focus of this Article. See Ira K. Lindsay, Humean Property Theory: A Defense, 
(working paper, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635246 [hereinafter Lindsay, 
Humean Property Theory]. In any case, it is unclear whether a robust theory of natural 
property rights is enough to ground tax equity principles. The basic problem is that 
natural rights theorists must still provide an account of why we should apportion taxes 
according to property holdings and not, for example, according to benefits derived 
from government or some other standard. Property holdings might be a rough proxy 
for benefits under certain circumstances. But often they are not. See Barbara H. Fried, 
Proportionate Taxation as a Fair Division of the Social Surplus: The Strange Career 
of an Idea, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 211, 237 (2003) (exploring some of the difficulties with 
claims that justice requires proportionate taxation). Regardless of whether natural 
property rights provide other grounds for favoring tax equity principles, those who 
favor a natural rights account of property ownership might accept my argument for 
tax equity as a principled compromise between persons who embrace differing ideal 
theories of distributive justice. 
20. Other commentators concur with Murphy and Nagel’s view that 
horizontal equity is a distraction from the real questions of horizontal and vertical 
equity. For example, after an extensive review of debates over horizontal equity, 
Repetti and Ring conclude that vertical equity and horizontal equity: 
 
[A]re together a single concept which lacks normative content and 
is itself only a proxy for theories of distributive justice and morality. 
It is a detour in history that led us to frame the issues of equality and 
fairness in the tax system in the language of VE and HE — a path 
which has both masked the emptiness of the concepts and 
overemphasized the possibility of two, distinct fairness inquires. We 
have been side-tracked from our larger task of tackling our 
disagreements over the underlying questions of distributive justice 
and morality . . . . 
 
Repetti & Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, supra note 3, at 155. 
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Although Murphy and Nagel favor egalitarian principles of 
distributive justice, an argument of similar form can be made by those who 
believe that tax laws should be arranged so as to maximize aggregate welfare 
or utility. From this perspective, horizontal and vertical equity are irrational 
metrics because tax rates should be set in whatever way maximizes welfare 
regardless of the implications for horizontal and vertical equity. Tax scholar 
Louis Kaplow makes an argument that has exactly this form.21 Kaplow 
advances a barrage of objections. First, he argues that proponents of horizontal 
equity have no principled way to decide how to measure horizontal equity.22 
Economists have proposed various indices for measuring tax equity. Kaplow 
claims, however, that they have little basis for choosing one over another 
because they lack a compelling theory of why to care about horizontal equity 
in the first place.23 Treating all taxpayers equally sounds appealing at first 
blush, but on closer inspection it is surprisingly hard to give an account of what 
this requires. Does equal treatment require that everyone pay an equal 
proportion of income? Or that everyone makes an equivalent sacrifice in terms 
of the degree to which taxation reduces welfare?24 Or that those who receive 
equal benefits pay equal tax? There are many different policies that can make 
some claim to equal treatment. It is far from clear that horizontal equity as 
defined above is the most appealing of these. In any case, Kaplow is able to 
cast his own view in egalitarian terms since utilitarianism can be described as 
                                                     
21. See, e.g., Kaplow, Horizontal Equity Measures, supra note 2, at 139–
54; see also KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 8, 
at 396–401; Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call 
for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 497 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow, A Fundamental 
Objection]. 
22. KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 
8, at 396–97. 
23. Insofar as this criticism is addressed to those who construct tax equity 
metrics that compare tax burdens before and after a tax reform, it is consistent with 
my position in this Article. The conception of horizontal equity I defend uses pre-tax 
income as the normative baseline. Tax reforms that reduce the variance in tax burdens 
among persons with equivalent income count as more horizontally equitable on this 
theory even if they greatly disrupt the pre-reform pattern of tax burdens. This is a 
sensible entailment. After all, one possible motivation for tax reform is to achieve 
greater horizontal equity in the sense of greater alignment between pre-tax income and 
tax obligations and thus a less distortionary tax system. 
24. Harvey Rosen has developed a model of horizontal equity that interprets 
horizontal equity as requiring equal sacrifice in terms of utility rather than equal tax 
payments. On this theory, a tax is horizontally equitable insofar as two people with 
equal pre-tax utility will have equal post-tax utilities. Harvey Rosen, An Approach to 
the Study of Income, Utility and Horizontal Equity, 92 Q.J.ECON. 307, 307–22 (1978). 
Rosen’s article uses a definition of horizontal equity proposed by Martin Feldstein. 
See Feldstein, Compensation in Tax Reform, supra note 4, at 124. 
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the principle of giving each person’s welfare equal weight in moral evaluation. 
This, it might be argued, is a way of expressing equal concern for every person. 
Kaplow’s approach has the advantage of evaluating equality at the level of 
objects of fundamental moral importance—welfare—rather than in terms of 
objects of only derivative importance—taxes. One might disagree with 
Kaplow’s choice of utilitarian moral principles, while agreeing with the force 
of his critique in this instance.25 Egalitarians such as Murphy and Nagel might 
think that Kaplow has chosen the wrong principle, but at least they can concur 
that “everyone’s welfare counts equally” is not a pointless formalism. 
Second, once one settles on a normative baseline such as pre-tax 
income, there will be conflicts between welfare maximizing tax schemes and 
horizontal equity.26 A simple example involves two people with differing 
propensities to shift from labor to leisure in response to taxation. Suppose these 
two people have the same pre-tax earning potential, but have very different 
propensities to reduce earnings in response to the same tax rate. Taxing the 
less tax sensitive person (i.e., the person less likely to change behavior in 
response to taxation) at a higher rate than the more tax sensitive person will 
usually be more efficient because the state will be able to collect the same 
amount of revenue while causing less distortion in economic activity. 
Although most deviations from horizontal equity reduce aggregate welfare, 
there are many reasons that violations of horizontal equity could increase 
aggregate welfare in particular instances. Retreating from welfarist principles 
to Pareto analysis does not solve this problem. Kaplow and Shavell have 
shown that non-welfarist principles such as horizontal equity will disfavor 
Pareto improvements in some instances, at least when considering preferences 
under conditions of uncertainty about one’s future income.27 
Kaplow issues a challenge to proponents of horizontal equity. Either 
they must explain why horizontal equity should be preferred, at least 
sometimes, to welfare maximization or give up on deploying horizontal equity 
as a meaningful criterion of tax justice.28 The fact that horizontally equitable 
policies sometimes maximize welfare and are sometimes Pareto efficient is no 
consolation if defenders of horizontal equity have no argument for preferring 
                                                     
25. To be clear, my argument in this Article does not require rejection of 
utilitarianism. It is compatible with a wide range of views in moral philosophy. 
26. Joseph Stiglitz has shown that horizontal equity cannot be derived from 
utilitarian premises and that welfare maximizing tax policy can be proven to violate 
horizontal equity given certain plausible assumptions. Joseph Stiglitz, Utilitarianism 
and Horizontal Equity: the Case for Random Taxation, 18 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1982). 
27. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarism Method of 
Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281, 281–86 
(2001). 
28. See, e.g., KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 
supra note 8, at 397. 
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it when tax equity and welfare maximization diverge. Appealing directly to 
welfare or Pareto efficiency simply concedes the field to supporters of welfare 
analysis by adopting welfare maximization as the fundamental normative 
criterion. 
Horizontal inequity, Kaplow concedes, is sometimes a proxy for 
welfare reductions in the form of increased exposure to risk and sometimes a 
proxy for rent-seeking.29 More generally, taxing two people with the same 
income to different amounts of money is not efficient unless we have some 
reason to think that the two people differ in some respect that has implications 
for tax efficiency. Inequitable treatment of individuals similarly situated with 
respect to the tax base might be an indication that something has gone wrong 
in our tax policy. And so we might be well-advised to pay attention to large 
horizontal inequities. But this does not, Kaplow points out, amount to any sort 
of an argument for caring intrinsically about horizontal equity or aiming for 
horizontal equity when designing tax policy. On the contrary, if horizontal 
equity is useful as a very rough proxy for welfare maximization, then the 
correct policy is to set taxes so as to maximize welfare regardless of whether 
doing so satisfies horizontal equity. In any case, even if we can make only very 
approximate judgments about welfare maximizing tax policy, horizontal 
equity is such a course-grained proxy that it is not of great use.30 
These arguments against tax equity principles have considerable 
intuitive appeal. I agree with Murphy and Nagel that property rights are 
conventional in the sense that people do not have pre-institutional property 
entitlements to particular objects external to their bodies31 and that it is myopic 
to consider the justification of property rights in isolation from tax policy.32 
But from the fact that property rights are conventional and that nobody has a 
non-institutional right to particular property entitlements, it does not follow 
that rules governing the creation and transfer of property entitlements cannot 
be judged unfair against the conventional baseline.33 People care about fair 
                                                     
29. Id. at 396–97. 
30. Id. at 400–01. 
31. This leaves open the possibility that people have a natural right to 
acquire some form of private property that must be respected in any just institutional 
arrangement. Eric Mack has advanced this interpretation of natural property rights. 
See Eric Mack, The Natural Right of Property, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 53, 53–78 
(2010). 
32. See generally Ira K. Lindsay, A Humean Theory of Property Rights 
(Sept. 12, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, on file with University of Michigan 
Library), http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/110373. 
33. Kevin Kordana and David Tabachnick criticize Murphy and Nagel for 
failing to recognize that one could reject pre-institutional entitlements to property 
while recognizing a role for “benefits” or “equal sacrifice” principles of tax fairness. 
Considerations of horizontal equity might become normatively relevant either on a 
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procedures in a great range of cases in which nobody has any antecedent right 
to a particular outcome.34 For example, nepotistic hiring procedures for 
government bureaucracies might be considered procedurally unfair even when 
there is no uniquely justified merit based hiring procedure such that any 
particular candidate has a claim to be hired on the merits. So there is nothing 
especially incongruous about rules of fairness that measure tax obligations in 
relation to property holdings even if nobody deserves their pre-tax property 
holdings as a matter of natural right. The challenge for defenders of tax equity 
is to develop a positive case for concern with horizontal and vertical equity as 
norms that constrain the translation of property holdings into tax obligations. 
This argument must show which of the many conceptions of horizontal equity 
should be preferred and show why horizontal equity should sometimes be 
preferred to welfare considerations. 
 
III. THREE PERSPECTIVES ON FAIRNESS 
 
There are at least three distinct ways to justify rules of fairness. I am 
concerned here with distributive fairness, although some of the analysis is 
likely to apply more broadly. My diagnosis of the debate over horizontal equity 
will be that horizontal equity makes little sense according to two modes of 
justification, but can be defended using a third justificatory strategy. Most 
prominent critiques of horizontal equity focus on this first conception of 
distributive fairness according to which horizontal equity is, indeed, an 
unhelpful formalism. But this is not the only way to justify rules of fairness 
and is not always the most appropriate approach. 
The first approach to fairness analyzes fair rules as rules derived from 
a comprehensive theory of distributive justice such as utilitarianism or John 
Rawls’s two principles of justice. This approach is the standard one in political 
philosophy and is often deployed in legal theory, although sometimes under 
the guise of wealth maximization or maximization of aggregate welfare. 
Evaluation of this type of fairness proceeds in two stages. At the first stage, 
we use some comprehensive normative theory to rank outcomes. 
                                                     
benefits theory or on an “equal sacrifice” theory. They conclude that “[w]hile it is true 
that there can be no blanket rule requiring horizontal equity, it does not follow that 
issues of uniformity do not count at all . . . . [I]ssues of uniformity can be relevant, if 
subordinate, to distributive aims.” Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Tax 
and the Philosopher’s Stone, 89 VA. L. REV. 647, 663 (2003). Although this somewhat 
minimalist defense of horizontal equity seems plausible to me, I will argue that tax 
equity principles have a somewhat different, and potentially more central, role in tax 
fairness. 
34. Perceptions of procedural fairness also play a large role in the 
legitimacy of governmental authorities. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW 161–65 (1990). 
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Utilitarianism, for example, ranks outcomes by considering levels of aggregate 
utility.35 A Rawlsian would rank outcomes in terms of the primary goods 
available to the least well off portion of the population.36 A more radical 
egalitarian might rank outcomes in terms of the degree of social inequalities 
they generate. More complex formulae are possible as well. For example, one 
might give priority to the least advantaged up to some level of welfare and 
then apply utilitarian calculus. Since John Rawls published A Theory of Justice 
in 1971, much work in Anglo-American political philosophy has focused on 
how to rank outcomes and so the menu of options is rather intricate.37 Once a 
ranking of possible outcomes has been established, the next step is to derive a 
body of rules that brings about the feasible outcome that ranks most highly. 
Rawlsians favor tax laws that, in conjunction with laws concerning property, 
contract, employment, entitlements and so on, maximize the prospects of the 
least advantaged group of citizens. A utilitarian, on the other hand, would 
design laws so as to maximize aggregate welfare.38 In neither case is there 
anything normatively distinctive about tax laws or tax policy. Taxes are just 
another tool to achieve distributive aims (albeit a highly useful and important 
tool). And they are to be judged by the same normative standards as the other 
tools. 
                                                     
35. Since there are many different ways that one might define utility, 
utilitarianism is really a family of theories, not a single theory. 
36. As with utilitarianism, the details could be filled in a number of different 
ways. 
37. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Equality of What? in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES 
ON HUMAN VALUES 195 (S. M. McMurrin ed., 2011); Richard J. Arneson, Equality 
and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989); Ronald Dworkin, What 
is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 283 (1981). 
38. Classical utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories are 
sometimes thought to be alternatives to concern with distributive fairness. See, e.g., 
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VS. WELFARE, supra note 15, at 52–62. When I refer 
here to distributive fairness, I am not using the term to refer exclusively to non-
welfarist considerations in the way that Kaplow and Shavell do. In fact, welfare 
maximization can plausibly be defended on grounds that are very similar to Rawls’s 
derivation of the difference principle. Suppose fairness requires the adoption of 
distributive principles that a self-interested person (or a benevolent, impartial 
spectator) would pick if she had an equal chance to be anyone in society. It is highly 
plausible that she would choose principles that maximize aggregate welfare since this 
would maximize her expected welfare. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, 
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 
309, 309–21 (1955). Louis Kaplow appeals explicitly to Harsanyi’s defense of 
utilitarianism in arguing that tax policy should be set according to utilitarian principles 
rather than tax equity considerations. See Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection, supra 
note 21, at 502–04. For the purposes that I am concerned with here, Rawls’s and 
Harsanyi’s arguments are rival versions of the same strategy. 
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This approach to distributive justice has a lot going for it. My point in 
this Article is not that such theories are not vital—they are—but merely that 
they are not the only way to approach questions of tax fairness. Rawlsian 
distributive justice, utilitarianism and similar comprehensive theories of 
distributive justice are powerful in that they can be used to weigh a huge range 
normatively relevant factors and can be applied to all kinds of policy questions. 
This makes them well-suited to ground academic discussions of taxation (e.g., 
Louis Kaplow’s theory of optimal taxation based on utilitarian moral 
principles), as well as for fine-grained analysis of particular policy proposals.39 
For example, utilitarianism has the advantage that it can suggest how to make 
trade-offs between highly disparate considerations such as administrative 
efficiency and redistribution to the less well off. Such theories have the 
weakness, however, of requiring agreement on a fully specified theory of 
justice in order to generate policy recommendations. For example, the question 
of how progressive tax rates should be depends on the precise details of one’s 
theory of distributive justice as well as upon a host of complex empirical 
questions. Utilitarians disagree with egalitarians and different sorts of 
egalitarians have disagreements with each other. When people disagree on 
abstract principles of distributive justice, comprehensive theories tend to 
provide little help in securing agreement on particular rules of fairness. 
Instead, they encourage ideological conflict as supporters of differing tax 
policies (who might be motivated by an ambiguous mixture of private interest 
and public-spiritedness) appeal to rival theories of distributive justice in order 
to bolster their positions. The interminable debate over progressive taxation in 
the United States is a familiar example. 
A second way of justifying rules of fairness is the theory of 
overlapping consensus.40 This approach was developed in response to the 
worry that when people appeal to comprehensive theories of distributive 
fairness, agreement about anything seems to require agreement about 
everything. Under the theory of overlapping consensus, different people may 
embrace different comprehensive theories of justice but nevertheless agree on 
certain principles that are independently justified under each of their theories. 
For example, arguments from a variety of perspectives might converge on a 
principle of freedom of speech. Natural rights theorists can support broad 
protections for speech as an important natural liberty. Consequentialists can 
support free speech for Millian reasons: over the long run, free and open 
discussion is the best way to arrive at the truth.41 Members of particular 
religious groups might support freedom of speech based on the tenants of their 
                                                     
39. KAPLOW, THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 
8, at 41–50. 
40. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133–72 (expanded ed. 2005). 
41. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15–52 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). 
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religion or as a corollary to their commitment to freedom of conscience. Other 
justifications of free speech are possible as well.  Overlapping consensus is 
closely related to Cass Sunstein’s notion of an incompletely theorized 
agreement.42 Because an incompletely theorized agreement can be justified in 
different ways by different comprehensive theory of justice, such agreements 
are often good strategies for reaching an overlapping consensus. Although I 
will argue that tax equity principles can be endorsed by people with a range of 
views concerning distributive justice, I do not think this is a matter of 
overlapping consensus in the sense discussed by Rawls or an incompletely 
theorized agreement in the sense discussed by Sunstein. Tax equity principles 
are not an area of partial agreement between rival comprehensive theories of 
distributive justice. In fact, tax equity principles are most useful precisely 
when differing theories of distributive justice do not yield an overlapping 
consensus about tax policy as is the case when some people support strongly 
redistributive taxation and other people oppose it. As will be argued below, 
horizontal equity might emerge as a compromise principle even when this is 
not precisely what any individual would choose if given a free hand to 
determine tax policy according to her preferred theory of distributive justice. 
My defense of tax fairness is based neither on a comprehensive theory 
of distributive justice nor on an overlapping consensus, but on a third approach 
to distributive fairness. Rather than thinking of rules of fairness as entailments 
of some comprehensive theory of justice, one might instead analyze fairness 
norms as conventional arrangements that facilitate cooperation between 
people with partially overlapping interests and differing views about 
distributive justice. Fairness norms of this type are conventional in the sense 
that they depend on the willingness of people to act fairly on the condition that 
others do so as well.43 It might be helpful to think of this sort of fairness norm 
as something like a kind of useful technology rather than as eternal principles 
of justice. Conventional rules of fairness are context sensitive, but are highly 
useful in the right circumstances. This sort of fairness—I will call it 
conventional fairness—involves the division of gains from cooperation in a 
way that promotes the long-run interests of all those in the cooperative 
                                                     
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1733 (1995). 
43. In his influential analysis of social norms Robert Sugden suggests that 
rules are likely to acquire moral force under two conditions: “1[.] Everyone (or almost 
everyone) in the relevant community follows the rule [and] 2[.] If any individual 
follows the rule, it is in his interest that his opponents – that is, the people with whom 
he deals – follow it too.” ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-
OPERATION AND WELFARE 170 (2004). For this reason, fairness norms tend to become 
moralized, although they can also function as amoral conventions as well. In such 
cases, people follow the convention out of a sense of self-interest and do not blame 
others for violating it. 
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scheme.44 Conventional fairness rules divide benefits in such a way that no 
potential gains are left on the table (i.e., the result is Pareto efficient) and that 
all participants have incentive to continue the cooperative relationship over the 
long haul.45 Conventional fairness is especially useful in contexts where there 
is a range of efficient outcomes and it is important for people to coordinate on 
one of many possible rules.46 Familiar conventional rules of fairness require 
respecting the property of others, sharing gains from a collective venture with 
one’s partners and contributing one’s fair share to public goods. Conventional 
fairness does not require equal treatment according to any particular standard, 
only that the rules are applied impartially and without favoritism so as to 
provide benefits to all who cooperate. Nevertheless, equality in contributions 
or benefits is often a psychologically salient solution to a bargaining problem. 
Thus it is common for business partners to split profits equally or homeowners 
to make equal contributions to a neighborhood association even when some 
more complex formula that weighs a range of pertinent considerations might 
apportion benefits and burdens slightly differently. 
Conventional fairness is non-ideal in the sense that it does not require 
agreement on common principles of distributive justice. In fact, it is especially 
useful in contexts in which people disagree about abstract, large-scale 
principles of distributive justice. Conventional fairness requires only that all 
agree that following a new norm would be better than the status quo and are 
willing to follow it on the condition that others do so as well.47 In this sense, it 
                                                     
44. My analysis is influenced by a number of theorists across several 
academic disciplines who use game theory to analyze social norms. See, e.g., id.; see 
also HERBERT GINTIS, THE BOUNDS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND THE 
UNIFICATION OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2009); KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY 
AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, VOL II: JUST PLAYING (1998); KEN BINMORE, GAME 
THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, VOL I: PLAYING FAIR (1994); Nicolas Baumard, 
Jean-Baptiste André, & Dan Sperber, A Mutualistic Approach to Morality: the 
Evolution of Fairness by Partner Choice, 36 BEHAV. AND BRAIN SCI. 59, 59–78 
(2013). 
45. The economist Ken Binmore argues that “fairness norms evolved 
because they allow groups who employ them to coordinate quickly on more efficient 
equilibria as they become available, and hence to outperform groups that remain stuck 
at the old equilibrium.” KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 171 (2005). 
46. H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 (1994) (“In 
problems of local justice, equity and efficiency often complement each other. 
Principles of equity are the instruments by which societies resolve distributive 
problems when efficiency by itself yields indeterminate results.”) [hereinafter YOUNG, 
EQUITY]. 
47. Conventional fairness is thus well suited for people who are conditional 
cooperators. That is, they are willing to follow rules that promote the common good 
even at some personal sacrifice but only on the condition that others will do so as well. 
Conditional cooperators differ on the one hand from pure altruists who act for the 
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represents a “bottom-up” approach to fairness as opposed to “top-down” 
theories that conceive of fair rules as ones that are part of a system that brings 
about desirable outcomes. Fairness rules of this third type thus play three roles: 
they select an equilibrium that allows people to coordinate their behavior, they 
divide cooperative surplus so that all have incentive to cooperate, and they 
legitimate distributive choices by providing a standard for division of surplus 
that is independent of the identities of particular people and does not depend 
on evaluation of their moral merits.48 Although conventional fairness follows 
a consequentialist logic, it is distinct from the norm of welfare maximization 
favored by Louis Kaplow. Fair rules improve on the status quo by the 
standards of all cooperators and in this sense are equitable, but do not 
necessarily bring about results that are welfare maximizing. Some welfare 
maximizing rules are unstable in contexts that require some degree of 
voluntary compliance and thus are not possible objects of conventions. And 
because an outcome may be an unambiguous improvement over the status quo 
without being the best possible result by anyone’s standards, fairness by 
convention may not select welfare maximizing options even when available. 
This is not, however, a reason to reject conventional fairness. In circumstances 
that require cooperation between people who disagree about ideal justice, 
conventional fairness has a vital role to play. 
 
                                                     
public good regardless of what others do and on the other hand from pure egoists who 
pursue their own interests regardless of what others do. 
48. H. Peyton Young concludes his book on equity with the following 
reflection: 
 
Why does it matter whether allocations are equitable? . . . A public 
agency that undertakes this type of analysis protects itself from 
charges of favoritism and capriciousness. Even for groups that 
theoretically could negotiate any solution they please, equity plays 
a critical role . . . . The reason is that distributive bargains are 
difficult to achieve without a framework that focuses the bargainers’ 
attention on particular outcomes. Equity principles play this role by 
defining which outcomes are more appropriate than others. The 
reason that equity is important, therefore, is that it coordinates and 
legitimates distributive choices . . . . Even when there is substantial 
disagreement about the relevant principles, however, it may still be 
possible to fashion outcomes that command broad support by 
explicitly following a process that takes differences of opinion into 
account, and strikes a balance between competing points of view. 
 
YOUNG, EQUITY, supra note 46, at 166–67. My suggestion is that horizontal and 
vertical equity play a similar role in tax policy. 
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IV. A DEFENSE OF TAX EQUITY 
 
The conventional fairness suggests a normative foundation for 
principles of tax equity without appeal to natural rights or pre-institutional 
moral desert. Even if one rejects theories of natural property rights, giving 
normative weight to pre-tax ownership may have value in preventing tax 
policy from unsettling the property entitlements fixed by private law. 
Horizontal equity and the minimalist principle of vertical equity are best 
understood as compromise principles for people who disagree about the 
empirical and moral facts bearing on the justice of redistributive taxation in 
order to prevent conflict over tax policy from generating the sort of negative 
sum resource conflict that property rights serve to prevent.49 What ideal theory 
of the sort favored by Murphy, Nagel and Kaplow obscures is the importance 
of principles, such as horizontal and vertical equity for structuring agreement 
between people who have starkly opposing moral and empirical commitments. 
Non-ideal theory, by contrast, addresses the problem of cooperation under 
conditions of moral disagreement and thus provides resources to understand 
fairness rules that seem irrational when considered from the perspective of 
ideal theory. 
An analogy to justifications of private property rights might help 
illuminate the role of tax equity principles. John Locke argued that people have 
a natural right to acquire property by mixing their labor with it so long as they 
leave “enough and as good” for others to use.50 Once property has been 
appropriated in this way, others are bound to respect an owner’s property rights 
and the state (if one comes into being) is bound to protect them. David Hume, 
by contrast, denied that property was a natural right and instead argued that 
property rights evolved as conventions of respect for the possessions of 
                                                     
49. The only similar critique of Murphy and Nagel’s work that I am aware 
of is Brian Galle’s. See Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 
1323–79 (2008). Galle argues that “horizontal equity can be reconceived as a 
commitment by the authors of tax legislation to honor the past and future policy 
choices of others, with whom they are jointly engaged in a project of deliberative 
democracy. Alternately, horizontal equity may be justified by welfare gains from a 
shared agreement to leave certain controversial questions of distributive justice 
undecided during the revenue-raising process.” Id. at 1323. My case for tax fairness 
unifies Galle’s alternative justifications of horizontal equity by showing how treating 
the existing distribution of property as normatively significant leads to welfare gains 
over the long run even if one does not assume that this distribution has any other 
morally attractive characteristics or that the policy choices of previous policymakers 
reflect any special moral insight. 
50. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
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others.51 Such possessions might have been originally acquired by means fair 
or foul (and any clear eyed view of history reveals that it quite often is the 
latter). Over time, people come to see the advantages of respecting the 
possessions of others on the condition that others do the same and a 
rudimentary property convention emerges: I will not trespass on your land or 
take your possessions so long as you do not trespass on my land or take my 
possessions. This property convention might not comport with anyone’s ideal 
conception of justice in the distribution of property rights. It certainly does not 
maximally serve the interests of any person since all people would be better 
off if they enjoyed their own possessions and were free to help themselves to 
those of others. Nevertheless, the property convention is an improvement over 
the status quo for all who are party to the convention.52 Observance of 
conventional property rights prevents negative sum free-for-all conflicts over 
resources and promises stable enjoyment of some possessions. Compared to a 
free-for-all, this is to the long-run advantage of all possessors of property and 
even benefits those who do not possess much property, but enjoy the increased 
security and prosperity brought about by respect for property conventions. 
Property rights, and indeed private law more generally, serve to prevent 
wasteful conflict by providing authoritative rules that determine who may take 
what actions with respect to which resources. This is the case even for property 
conventions with morally neutral content, such as everyone gets enforceable 
property rights over whatever objects they currently possess (regardless of 
how they came to get them). 
This analysis of the justification of private property might be extended 
to rules of fairness for apportioning the benefits and burdens of cooperation 
between property owners. Even when private law defines stable property 
rights, there is a danger that the equilibrium established in the private sphere 
will be upset by aggressive use of public law. Just as property rights function 
                                                     
51. “[J]ustice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that 
is, by a sense of interest, suppos’d to be common to all, and where every single act is 
perform’d in expectation that others are to perform the like.” DAVID HUME, A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 498 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896) (1738). 
52. The question of whether those who have few possessions or none at all 
have reason (moral or material) to comply with the convention is complex. On the one 
hand, stability in possession and the greater peace and prosperity that they bring will, 
on average, benefit even those without property through higher wages, less warfare 
and the possibility of acquiring private property in the future. This must be balanced 
against the prospects from grabbing possessions in a free-for-all. Elsewhere, I argue 
that those currently without property usually do have reason to respect property 
conventions and that the conventional logic of property rights implies that private 
ownership of valuable resources should be coupled with significant social welfare 
provisions (of some form) that ensure that all share in the benefits of property 
conventions. See Lindsay, Humean Property Theory, supra note 19. 
2016] Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity 99 
to prevent wasteful resource conflict in the private sphere, rules of tax fairness 
serve to constrain self-interested parties who may wish to use the tax system 
to gain at the expense of their fellow citizens.53 By requiring that similarly 
situated persons be treated similarly and that persons with more income pay 
more tax, principles of tax fairness limit the extent to which distributions of 
wealth that have been fixed by private law may be unsettled by public law. 
Horizontal and vertical equity do not rule out sharply progressive rates of 
taxation and so are fully consistent with high levels of redistribution from rich 
to poor. The minimal principle of vertical equity is violated by extreme forms 
of redistribution from poor to rich, such as a tax that applies to wage laborers 
and salaried workers but not to fund managers or a policy of allowing interest 
deductions for second homes but not for first cars. Horizontal equity is violated 
by certain kinds of redistribution between groups that are similarly situated 
with respect to income, such as redistribution from farmers to factory workers 
via a tax credit for “manufacturing labor.” The two principles thus rule out 
forms of redistribution that are prima facie suspicious while remaining neutral 
on the extent to which tax policy ought to mitigate income inequality as a 
general matter. 
Different polities might adopt different tax bases (income, 
consumption, or wealth) or different levels of progressivity (different personal 
exemptions and different tax rates for income over a certain threshold). Since 
there is more than one way of specifying the tax base, there is more than one 
plausible fairness norm for taxation. As long as the tax base is wide, however, 
observance of tax fairness norms will constrain the extent to which tax policy 
can be used to destabilize relative property entitlements. Once a tax base has 
been fixed, the norm of horizontal equity requires that any difference in tax 
obligation for two people with the same position vis-à-vis the tax base must be 
justified in terms of some public interest other than raising revenue. Such 
justifications might include disincentives for socially harmful activities such 
                                                     
53. John Miller makes a similar point in his qualified defense of tax equity 
principles. He suggests that horizontal equity: 
 
[S]erves the limited, but crucial, purpose of checking that ordinary 
human impulse to let the other person carry the lion’s share of the 
tax burden. If we are only able to “tax that fellow behind the tree” 
by imposing an equally heavy burden on ourselves, a profound 
restraint may overtake us. Since the fellow behind the tree is subject 
to the same restraint, an allegiance to horizontal equity protects me 
from him as well as he from me. In our society a strong allegiance 
to horizontal equity serves as a way to avoid deep and abiding strife 
with respect to taxation. 
 
John A. Miller, Equal Taxation: A Commentary, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 529, 540 (2000). 
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as air pollution or subsidies for socially beneficial activities. Taxes used in this 
way as a sort of regulatory policy are known as Pigouvian taxes after the 
English economist, Arthur Cecil Pigou, who showed how taxes could be used 
to correct externalities by altering the market price of an activity so as to reflect 
total social cost.54 The opposite policy, tax deductions or tax credits designed 
to encourage certain forms of behavior, are really a covert sort of public 
spending—tax expenditures—and must be justified as a worthy use of public 
resources.55 Because candidates for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are not 
especially hard to come by, the public interest criterion is not a hugely 
restrictive constraint.56 Therefore, the principle of horizontal equity should not 
be seen as ruling out any deviation from equal treatment of those equally 
positioned relative to the tax base, but as requiring a particular sort of 
justification for such deviations. Tax expenditures and Pigouvian taxes must 
not only serve a public purpose, but also be a more efficient means to this end 
than the alternatives including regulation and direct government spending.57 
Because legislators are besieged by an endless army of special interest 
lobbyists whose job is to construct arguments that their clients’ favorite tax 
benefits are really in the public interest, principles of tax fairness exert less 
normative pressure in practice than if taxes were negotiated by taxpayers 
themselves. However, even in this dysfunctional context, compromise on a 
package of measures that reduce deductions and credits in order to lower tax 
rates or raise revenue is a promising formula for comprehensive tax reform. 
Although tax fairness norms cannot be used to deduce a unique tax 
regime from a set of property entitlements, they serve to structure tax policy 
in a way that may be embraced by people with opposing policy preferences. 
Consider two people, John and Robert, who have fundamentally different 
views about distributive justice. John favors highly egalitarian tax and transfer 
policies, whereas Robert favors policies that do not greatly alter market 
outcomes. The current Code is somewhere between the policy preferences of 
John and Robert: John favors a more progressive Code and Robert favors a 
                                                     
54. See generally A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
55. See generally EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: 
HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 241–63 (2015) (discussing federal 
tax expenditures in the United States). 
56. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian 
State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93 (2015) (arguing that Pigouvian taxes are generally 
superior to “command and control” regulations and should play a greater role in 
regulatory policy). 
57. Because tax expenditures are often poorly targeted even when they do 
have a genuinely public purpose (i.e., many people get a tax break for doing what they 
would do anyway), many violations of horizontal equity will fail this test even when 
they pass the public interest test. See Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for 
Pigouvian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1673 (2015) (observing that Pigouvian taxes are 
efficient responses to only a limited number of externalities). 
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less progressive Code. Given the current Code, John tends to favor any tax 
breaks that will result in a more egalitarian distribution of post-tax income, 
while Robert tends to favor tax breaks that will counteract progressive tax 
rates, thereby resulting in a less egalitarian distribution. Thus, John prefers to 
make food purchases at grocery stores deductible since this would benefit 
those with low-income more than those with high-income, but Robert would 
like to abolish limits on student loan and educational expense deductions for 
high-income taxpayers since this will tend to favor the wealthy and bring 
effective tax rates closer to his preferred flat tax. However, achieving “tax 
justice” through a motley assortment of tax breaks is inefficient. Additionally, 
it is unfair to those whose tastes are not favored by the resulting subsidies. It 
might be better for both John and Robert if they each agree to abstain from 
supporting these sorts of tax breaks even when one of them thinks the 
particular policy desirable in light of their larger theory of distributive justice. 
Adherence to horizontal equity, therefore, represents a compromise position 
that is neutral between John’s and Robert’s substantive views about 
progressive taxation, but will make the Code better by each of their lights at 
any given level of progressivity.58 The same may be true if John and Robert 
are self-interested taxpayers rather than ideologues: lower tax rates without tax 
subsidies are, ceteris paribus, preferable to a patchwork of inefficient tax 
subsidies for both John and Robert if each prefers different subsidies and both 
are equally likely to get their preferred subsidies enacted. It may also be true 
if John and Robert are public-spirited citizens who share a common theory of 
justice, but disagree about the empirical consequences of various tax policies. 
As the example of John and Robert suggests, norms of fair 
contribution are functionally similar to property rules in that, if they are 
generally respected, they prevent wasteful competition over resources. One of 
the virtues of private law (or at least the private law of major common law and 
civil law legal systems) is that it defines access to resources according to 
impersonal rules of a general character. Although the resulting distribution of 
property might sometimes turn out to be substantively undesirable, the process 
by which property entitlements are created and transferred will be (at least in 
a well-functioning legal system) procedurally fair in the sense that it does not 
result from favoritism to particular individuals or groups.59 It allows resolution 
of disputes over resources without resort either to moral first principles or to 
judgments about the general moral merits or demerits of particular individuals. 
                                                     
58. Note that this is not a case of overlapping consensus, but instead a sort 
of mutual disarmament. John and Robert each have different preferences for tax 
policy, yet each may be willing to give up some of their second best strategies if the 
other is willing to do so as well. 
59. The contrast here is with estate based societies in which rights and 
duties are determined in large part by one’s social group, and thus, the same rules are 
not generally applicable to all members of society, but only to members of a particular 
estate. 
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For example, rather than asking who is most deserving of a particular plot of 
land, one need only to apply the preexisting legal rules that determine property 
entitlements. Tax laws that apply to abstract economic categories (property, 
income, or consumption) rather than to particular activities or to identifiable 
groups of people are, ceteris paribus, preferable for the same reason. By 
contrast, taxes, deductions, and credits targeted at narrow classes of readily 
identifiable individuals (for example, the tax on purchases of chocolate ice-
cream) are prima facie suspicious. As Murphy and Nagel point out, it would 
be foolish to think that a taxpayer has a moral entitlement to any particular 
structure of relative prices.60 However, it does not follow from this that any 
way of setting prices is equally fair. Chocolate ice-cream lovers have no 
grounds for complaint if supply chain problems cause chocolate ice-cream to 
become more expensive than vanilla. However, it does seem objectionable if 
prices rise because those who do not like chocolate ice-cream succeed in 
shifting the tax burden to those who do. 
There are at least two problems with arbitrary taxes and tax 
expenditures. First, they often represent rent-seeking behavior.61 Laws such as 
a deduction for vanilla ice-cream purchases do not have an even vaguely 
plausibly public purpose. Rather, the law is simply an attempt to shift the tax 
burden from one group of people to another. It is the functional equivalent of 
a wealth transfer that distorts private consumption decisions. For this reason, 
rent-seeking taxes and tax subsidies are likely to be negative sum policies. 
Second, narrowly targeted taxes and tax expenditures have the effect of 
substituting public judgments about what is worth consuming for private 
judgments. This effect is particularly strong at high marginal tax rates. 
Substituting public judgment for private judgment burdens citizens with 
minority tastes. This may be entirely appropriate when people have private 
preferences for socially harmful activities, such as air pollution, alcohol use, 
and so forth. However, since one of the purposes of private property is to 
provide a sphere of individual control in which individuals may make choices 
according to their own values and own tastes, allowing majority tastes (or the 
interests of a concentrated minority) to trump minority tastes undermines part 
of the rationale for private ownership. If my neighbor prefers relatively larger 
houses than I do, then this is a good reason for him to buy a larger house and 
                                                     
60. MURPHY & NAGEL, MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 9 at 109. 
61. Rent-seeking is behavior that aims to achieve profit beyond the normal 
risk adjusted rate of return by receiving special privileges from the government. 
“Rents” in this sense of the term might include monopoly privileges, state subsidies, 
or regulations that provide special benefits to particular parties. Unlike profits earned 
in competitive markets through more efficient production, “rents” do not represent 
gains in national wealth but rather wealth transfers from one party to another. See 
generally Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. 291 (1974). 
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for me to buy a smaller one, but not a good reason for the government to tax 
me more than him.62 Although some degree of such unfairness is inevitable (in 
particular, it is very hard to treat preferences for consumption of leisure and 
market goods symmetrically), this does not mean that we should give up on 
the notion of tax neutrality altogether in favor of some fully specified theory 
of distributive justice. 
People do not need to agree on principles of distributive justice to 
agree that rent-seeking tax discrimination is an unfair allocation of burdens. 
Horizontal equity serves to pick out normatively suspect tax provisions. As the 
John and Robert example showed, it is advantageous for people with differing 
views on progressive taxation to agree on opposing policies that violate 
horizontal or vertical equity without any justification in terms of regulation of 
externalities. Fairness judgments that track such hypothetical agreements play 
a valuable role by ruling out certain policies even in the face of disagreement 
over larger questions of distributive justice or empirical uncertainty about their 
consequences. Evaluating tax policy exclusively from the perspective of post-
tax outcomes effaces the role of fairness norms in allowing people with 
disparate views to cooperate on questions of tax policy. If a single person could 
design and guarantee enforcement of a tax code that perfectly implements his 
or her ideal theory of distributive justice, he or she could ignore metrics, such 
as horizontal and vertical equity that use pretax holdings or income as a 
normative baseline. However, this is not remotely like the situation faced by 
anyone living under a democratic government.63 Therefore, tax fairness is a 
genuine concern for real world (as opposed to ideal theory) tax policy, and not 
merely a distraction from the real questions of distributive justice or optimal 
                                                     
62. Murphy and Nagel think that this question should be decided on the 
basis of 
 
(a) whether it distorts the broader pattern of redistribution and 
financing of public provision that our general conception of justice 
requires, by shifting some of the costs or by surreptitiously 
diminishing or increasing the amount of redistribution; (b) whether 
it serves other purposes, legitimate for fiscal policy, which are 
important enough to override any such shortfall. 
 
MURPHY & NAGEL, MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 9, at 171. This analysis seems 
to identify the right trade-off. However, it is possible to bracket questions concerning 
general conceptions of justice and to simply ask whether the policy benefits are worth 
the violation of horizontal equity (a principle that may be shared by partisans of widely 
differing conceptions of justice). 
63. Indeed, modern tax codes are sufficiently complex that they will require 
coordination between different officials even in a political regime in which decision 
makers are not accountable to the populace. 
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taxation. Property entitlements provide a useful baseline against which to 
evaluate public goods contributions precisely so that discussion of tax 
obligations does not reduce to the question of who deserves what post-tax 
income. Rules of tax equity secure a stable framework for mutually 
advantageous cooperation rather than arrange affairs to correspond to 
principles of justice extrinsic to our actual institutions. Using pretax income as 
a normative baseline is instrumental to this end whether or not it has any other 
special moral status. 
This bottom-up perspective on tax fairness can illuminate the debate 
over the flat tax. One could make an argument for proportionate taxation (i.e., 
the flat tax) analogous to the defense of horizontal equity outlined above. One 
of the dangers of any scheme of taxation, particularly when combined with 
generous transfer payments, is that the tax system will be used to entirely 
efface the pattern of entitlements generated by the relatively impersonal rules 
of private law by redistribution in accordance with political power. One might 
think that the former tends to be a positive sum, whereas the latter tends to be 
a negative sum game.64 In other words, where property law is supposed to 
define entitlements in such a way as to prevent a wasteful free-for-all, a regime 
of excessive and inequitable taxation may serve to unsettle distributive 
questions by recreating a free-for-all in the political arena. This is pathological. 
Opponents and proponents of proportionate taxation should be able to agree 
that the minimal principle of vertical equity is a good heuristic for 
distinguishing tax schemes (especially regressive schemes)65 designed to 
transfer wealth from the less powerful to the more powerful from tax regimes 
that might have a plausible justification in terms of risk spreading. Taxation 
proportional to income or wealth might be best justified by analogy to vertical 
equity as a psychologically salient compromise rule that severely constrains 
use of the Code for negative sum redistribution and other forms of wasteful 
rent seeking. Barbara Fried suggests psychological salience as a deflationary 
explanation for the broad popularity of proportional taxation schemes 
(including among unlikely figures such as John Rawls).66 But if the foregoing 
                                                     
64. Of course, it is hard to generalize here. If private law is configured to 
give a few individuals monopolistic positions that allow them to accrue great rents at 
the expense of everyone else, private ordering could be quite undesirable. Conversely, 
risk-spreading via tax and transfer programs may be generally positive sum. 
65. Since wealthy people are likely to have disproportionate political power 
for a variety of reasons, regressive tax schemes that shift the tax burden onto non-elites 
are quite common in the historical record. Democratic government may be atypical in 
this respect. 
66. Fried argues, 
 
The ‘focal point’ explanation may explain why people as divergent 
in their political commitments as Rawls, Hayek, Gauthier and 
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defense of fairness norms in taxation is correct, then the argument from 
psychological salience may be quite plausible under certain conditions. Insofar 
as stable convergence of judgment among persons with disparate moral 
commitments is important, psychological salience is a normatively relevant 
factor. Whether this is a good argument for adopting a flat tax depends on 
institutional context. In affluent counties with stable and relatively well-
functioning political systems, I do not see great value in requiring 
proportionate taxation, especially if norms of vertical equity are observed so 
as to prevent upward redistribution, which is broadly agreed to be undesirable 
as a matter of principle.67 Under conditions of poorly constrained 
governments, low social trust, highly predatory elites, or class or ethnic 
conflicts that lend themselves to a taste for punitive taxation, the case for 
norms that sharply constrain taxation authority is stronger.68 The larger point 
here is that there may be some trade-off between institutional stability and the 
ability to achieve optimal policy. Norms that provide greater stability and 
protect against governmental predation sometimes impede the pursuit of 
optimal policy. The costs and benefits of this trade-off will be different in 
every context. 
This defense of horizontal equity as a principle of fairness is 
responsive to the criticisms advanced by Murphy, Nagel and Kaplow. It 
provides reason to think, pace Murphy and Nagel, that pre-tax income is 
normatively significant. It does so not by defending a controversial theory of 
                                                     
Epstein have gravitated towards proportionate rates to begin with, 
as good-faith, unselfconscious participants in a Schelling-like 
convergence. It may also explain why people like Epstein and 
Hayek, who are clearly predisposed against progressiv[e taxation] 
on libertarian or quasi-libertarian grounds, would fix on flat rates for 
strategic reasons, seeing it as an alternative that is both politically 
obtainable and politically sustainable. 
 
Barbara H. Fried, Proportionate Taxation as a Fair Division of the Social Surplus: 
The Strange Career of an Idea, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 211, 237 (2003). 
67. Insofar as the real problem is rent-seeking, comparison of the United 
States corporate tax code and individual tax code suggests that eliminating progressive 
tax rates would not be helpful in the United States. The corporate tax rate is 35 percent 
for all midsized or large corporations, but the effective tax rate varies greatly across 
different companies and across different sectors of the economy. See Aswath 
Damodaran, Tax Rate by Sector (U.S.), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_ 
Home_Page/datafile/taxrate.htm (last updated Jan. 2016) (providing recent data on the 
effective corporate tax rates across by sector in the United States). The individual tax 
code is less distorted by credits and deductions despite a far more progressive rate 
structure. 
68. Of course, under these conditions, it is likely to be difficult to reach 
agreement on proportionate taxation or even to inculcate the necessary sense of 
fairness, so it may be that the flat tax is infeasible precisely where it is needed. 
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natural rights or moral desert, but by showing how treating pre-tax income as 
a normative baseline improves tax policy. It addresses Kaplow’s critique by 
suggesting that optimal tax analysis and horizontal equity are not competitors, 
but play different roles that are relevant at different levels of analysis. 
Utilitarianism is an ideal theory of distributive justice that competes with other 
ideal theories such as neo-Lockean natural rights theories and Rawls’ 
difference principle. Horizontal equity is an intermediate level principle 
suitable for non-ideal circumstances. A utilitarian might endorse horizontal 
equity as a compromise position when making policy with non-utilitarians. 
The point is not merely that horizontal equity is a proxy for utility—although 
it may also be that—but that adhering to it consistently will improve the Code 
according to a range of ideal theories and so, unlike other proxies for utility 
maximization, it is one that can allow utilitarians to find common ground with 
non-utilitarians. When utilitarians find themselves able to implement policy 
without negotiation with others, they may eschew tax equity principles and 
focus on welfare maximization directly. This may sometimes be the case when 
regulatory agencies have broad discretion to craft policy. Tax legislation, by 
contrast, is usually the product of negotiation between legislators who 
represent a wide range of interests and are unlikely (to the extent that they 
think about them at all) to agree on ideal principles of tax fairness. 
Finally, my defense of horizontal equity does not require that we 
resolve the question of which interpretation of horizontal equity is the “right” 
one. Because horizontal equity is a conventional principle of justice, the 
appropriate interpretation depends on the background conditions, in this case 
the tax base. Equal taxation for those with equal levels of consumption is 
appropriate in a consumption tax system, whereas equal taxation for those with 
equal incomes is appropriate in an income tax system and so forth. My defense 
of horizontal equity is neutral on the question of whether we should prefer a 
tax base of consumption, income or wealth. Such questions must be decided 
on other grounds. 
Horizontal equity has a limited, but potentially important role. It does 
not represent a deep principle of justice in the way that welfare maximization 
or the difference principle might. Instead, it is a principle of non-ideal fairness 
useful for constraining tax policy in contexts of ideological disagreement. If 
one is accustomed to thinking of justice in terms of ideal theory, this might 
seem disappointing or deflationary. However, since ideological disagreement 
over taxation is pervasive, non-ideal theory is highly germane in this context. 
The real limitation on the normative force of horizontal equity is its 
conventional nature. In order for horizontal equity to serve as a focal point for 
compromise, a particular interpretation of horizontal equity must enjoy broad 
acceptance and there must be a degree of trust that others abide by 
conventional rules of fairness. Because conventional norms depend upon 
broad acceptance, we should worry that arguments against the coherence of 
tax equity principles may be self-fulfilling. Since the normative force of 
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horizontal equity is that it is a focal point for agreement between people with 
differing interests and normative commitments, it makes no sense to worry 
about tax equity principles if no one else in society pays any heed to them or 
thinks that they have any significance. In such cases, it is best to pursue the 
policies indicated by one’s preferred mode of ideal theory. Horizontal equity 
does seem to have had influence in the twentieth century both because of the 
arguments of public finance economists, such as Richard Musgrave and 
Joseph Pechman, and because of its intuitive appeal to the general public. Its 
advantages could be lost if tax equity principles are ridiculed out of serious-
minded policy discourse. 
 
V. IS HORIZONTAL EQUITY VACUOUS OR BANAL? 
 
The question of the appropriate tax base suggests a potentially fatal 
objection to my defense of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity is a vacuous 
principle until the tax base is defined. One might worry that any tax scheme 
may be horizontally equitable if the tax base is defined precisely so as to 
exclude all deductible and creditable items. For example, if one wants to 
impose a special tax on certain exotic animals and give tax deductions for 
tourism in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, one could define the tax base as all 
income, plus the value of all zebras and capybaras owned by taxpayers less 
expenditures on vacations in the Upper Peninsula. Although these policies are 
frivolous, a large number of deductions including education and medical 
expenses can plausibly be defended as “not really income” in the relevant 
sense either because they are really a form of investment69 or because they 
represent non-discretionary spending that is categorically different from other 
consumption.70 The danger is that any credit, deduction, or surcharge may be 
justified by defining the tax base so that it includes or excludes the relevant 
items. If so, all disputes over taxes, credits, and deductions could be recast as 
disputes over rival principles of horizontal equity. Some limits must be placed 
on what can count as an acceptable tax base for horizontal equity to be a 
principle that meaningfully constrains tax policy. 
At minimum, the tax base must meet three criteria. First, it must be 
broad. If a tax that is paid into general revenue affects only a small number of 
people, there is reason to worry that the relationship between taxpayers and 
non-taxpayers is inequitable even if the tax is horizontally equitable with 
                                                     
69. Technically, this suggests that education should be treated as a capital 
asset and should give the taxpayer basis that might be deducted against future labor 
income attributable to investments in education. However, this scheme would 
probably be too hard to administer through the Code given the difficulty of 
determining baseline income. 
70. Given the current structure of health care spending, this does not seem 
especially realistic. It may have been more realistic in the early twentieth century. 
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respect to those who do pay it. Second, the tax base should be psychologically 
salient. An overly complex tax base is not likely to trigger intuitions 
concerning equity. Additionally, if people have difficulty keeping track of 
their position relative to others, horizontally equitable tax rates are unlikely to 
have a legitimating effect. Finally, the tax base should be economically 
meaningful. A tax base that does not track citizens’ economic status 
reasonably well will not be perceived as fair even if tax rates are horizontally 
equitable relative to this base. These criteria leave open a wide array of 
options. Income taxes, wealth taxes, VATs, endowment taxes (taxes based on 
ability to earn), and consumption taxes all easily qualify. However, tariffs, 
luxury taxes, and payroll taxes seem questionable, at least if they are used 
primarily to raise general purpose revenue and not for some other end, such as 
industrial policy or to fund a program specifically related to the nature of the 
tax such as unemployment insurance financed by a payroll tax. 
Of course, even if the economic nature of the tax base (i.e., income, 
consumption, wealth) has been settled, there are thousands of minor questions 
concerning what counts as income or consumption.71 Some of these can be 
settled by basic economic principles. For example, jury duty pay should count 
as income in an income tax system whereas insurance payments for property 
damage should not. Others, however, have no obvious theoretical answer: who 
counts as a taxpayer? How should we distinguish between deductible business 
expenses and non-deductible personal expenses when a purchase has dual 
purposes? Some questions will be settled on grounds of administrative 
convenience or, when there are off-setting considerations on each side, on 
more or less arbitrary grounds. Considerations of horizontal equity cannot be 
used to resolve all important tax questions. Horizontal equity plays an 
important, but limited, role and is not an all-purpose solution for any tax policy 
problem. Forcing horizontal equity to bear too much weight is, if my account 
is correct, one reason that previous treatments of the principle have been 
unsatisfying. 
                                                     
71. Even when people agree on tax equity principles in the abstract, there 
is a danger that there will be no agreement on the tax base against which to measure 
tax equity. This is particularly likely when a tax code has become so chaotic that it is 
genuinely unclear whether, for example, it best approximates an income tax or a 
consumption tax. The difference between the two is less obvious than it might seem 
because one might approximate a consumption tax by implementing an income tax in 
which investment income is exempted from taxation. There is no fact of the matter in 
terms internal to tax equity about whether horizontal equity vis-à-vis income is 
preferable to horizontal equity vis-à-vis consumption. When faced with an extremely 
chaotic tax code, people might reasonably embrace conflicting interpretations of 
horizontal equity. Tax equity will, therefore, tend to have greater efficacy a relatively 
well-ordered tax system than in one that has become arbitrary to the point of 
incoherence. 
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Simple interpretations of horizontal equity are preferable to highly 
complex ones because they reduce disagreement over whether particular 
policies are equitable or inequitable. This provides reason to favor 
interpretations of horizontal equity expressed in terms of financial metrics 
(such as the amount of tax owed) rather than utility metrics (such as reductions 
in welfare). Measuring horizontal equity in terms of equal sacrifice of utility 
is attractive insofar as it addresses the problem that people with the same level 
of income may have quite different marginal utilities of income because, for 
example, they have different tastes for labor and leisure.72 Although measuring 
changes in utility is preferable to measuring changes in income in the sense 
that utility is more normatively important, this benefit may be outweighed by 
the uncertainty involved in converting units of income to units of utility. The 
assessment of income tax on households rather than on individuals presents a 
further complication for utility-based metrics. Comparing tax obligations 
across households poses no difficulty. Comparing utility levels, however, 
introduces a host of difficult problems. Whereas it is economically meaningful 
to talk of the income or wealth enjoyed by a household, it is rather fantastical 
to attribute utility to the household as a collective entity. Households are made 
up of individuals each of whom has their own utility function. A change in tax 
policy might have quite different consequences for different members of the 
same household. The dynamics are likely to be different in single earner 
households than for dual income couples and different for households with 
children and without children. Although one can create sophisticated 
economic models to describe these dynamics, it is hard to see how a policy can 
be publicly recognized as horizontally equitable in utility terms. Rather than 
seeking out an ideal interpretation of horizontal equity in terms of utility, it is 
probably better to stick with metrics such as income or wealth that can be 
defined in terms that are relatively transparent.73 
                                                     
72. See Feldstein, Compensation in Tax Reform, supra note 4, at 124. 
73. Similar considerations disfavor changes to the tax base. Because 
horizontal equity is measured in relation to a particular tax base, changes to the tax 
base tend to destabilize conventions of tax equity. For this reason, once a broad and 
economically meaningful tax base has been specified and taxes are set so as to be 
horizontally equitable relative to this base, there should be a presumption in favor of 
letting well enough alone. Moreover, because taxpayers plan their activities in light of 
the law, any significant change in the law will usually entail “transition costs” as 
taxpayers rearrange their activities in light of the new laws. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, 
Legal Expectations, Rational Expectations and Legal Progress, 13 J. COMTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 211 (2003); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of 
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). Changes in tax 
law will, ceteris paribus, be wasteful. That the tax base could have been specified 
differently if one were designing the Code from scratch is not reason to think that 
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An altogether different reason for thinking that horizontal equity is 
trivial is the objection that it does not rule out any sort of taxation that can be 
endorsed on principled grounds. Horizontal equity might, according to this 
objection, be a useful heuristic for identifying suspicious provisions in the 
Code, but does not do any real normative work because all good faith 
observers will generally oppose horizontally inequitable policies on other 
grounds. This conclusion is too strong. As already noted, welfare maximizing 
tax policy can be proven to violate horizontal equity given certain plausible 
assumptions.74 In a variety of contexts there is an efficiency case for arranging 
tax burdens in a way that violates horizontal equity. This means that utilitarians 
must sometimes decide whether potential increases in welfare from more 
efficient tax policies are worth the potential future reductions of welfare that 
may result from undermining horizontal equity as a focal point for 
compromise. One example involves so-called Ramsey taxation.75 The intuitive 
idea behind Ramsey taxation is that taxes are more efficient insofar as they do 
not change behavior. If revenue is raised through a consumption tax, higher 
taxes on products with relatively inelastic demand curves will be more 
efficient than taxes levied on products for which demand is elastic. Inelastic 
demand curves are ones for which changes in consumption are not very 
sensitive to changes in price and so when the price to consumers is increased 
by the imposition of a tax, consumer behavior changes little. Although Ramsey 
taxation might be economically efficient, it may have sharply differing effects 
on people with similar levels of consumption or income. If one person is 
inclined to consume more of the taxed product than another person, the first 
person will bear more of the tax burden. Although the tax elasticities of labor 
supply are probably less than those of demand for most consumer items (in 
other words, people are less likely to change their work habits in response to 
taxation than they are to change their buying habits), it is possible to use a 
similar strategy with respect to taxation of income. This would involve taxing 
people at different rates depending on whether they fall into groups likely to 
work less when faced with higher taxes.76 It is possible, therefore, for 
                                                     
changes to an existing tax base should be taken lightly. These considerations do not 
outweigh the gains from very substantial improvements in the Code, but do call into 
question whether the advantages of smaller improvements are worth the costs. In any 
case, the difficulty of making significant changes in the Code might render these 
considerations somewhat less practically significant in the U.S. context. 
74. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for 
Random Taxation, 18 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1982). 
75. Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. 
J. 47 (1927). 
76. Arguably the Code already does so to the extent that it allows 
entrepreneurs (who might be more tax sensitive) to realize some of their income as 
capital gains and thus pay a lower effective tax rate than salaried employees. However, 
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horizontal equity to conflict with considerations of economic efficiency (as 
well as a variety of other considerations). This is not to say that horizontal 
equity should always trump other normative considerations. Judgments must 
be made on a case-by-case basis. Since the value of horizontal equity depends 
heavily on context, it is not possible to give a mechanical account of how to 
resolve such questions. In general, however, small deviations from horizontal 
equity should not trump large gains in efficiency, but small gains in efficiency 
are usually not worth very large deviations from horizontal equity. 
 
VI. DOES HORIZONTAL EQUITY MATTER IN PRACTICE? 
 
The last several sections have been devoted to a theoretical 
exploration of the significance of horizontal equity as a principle of fairness 
that facilitates coordination on tax law between persons with differing 
normative or empirical views. In this section, I present evidence that horizontal 
equity actually does play this role in practice. First, taxpayers tend to view 
more horizontally equitable policies as more legitimate, which makes voters 
more willing to support taxes and taxpayers less likely to evade them. Second, 
successful tax reform efforts in the past have used the goal of horizontal equity 
as a focal point for compromise and as a tool to build the support necessary to 
overcome opposition from those who benefit from tax inequities. 
Like many other social institutions, tax collection relies on a high 
degree of voluntary compliance, without which the sheer volume of 
opportunistic law-breaking would overwhelm the ability of authorities to 
detect and punish violations of the law. For this reason, tax morale—the 
willingness of taxpayers to comply with the law for reasons other than the fear 
of formal sanctions—is crucially important. Tax morale is sensitive to a range 
of factors including attitudes toward the state, ethical commitments, 
perceptions of tax fairness, perceptions of procedural fairness, perceptions of 
tax compliance by other taxpayers, and perceptions of influence over 
government policy. Many, if not most, taxpayers comply with tax laws 
voluntarily even when tax evasion might have positive expected value given 
the probability of audits and enforcement.77 Revenue collection would be far 
                                                     
this is an artifact of the general distinction between ordinary income and capital gains 
rather than a purposeful attempt to treat different types of labor differently. 
77. Erich Kirchler explains that: 
 
[A] large number of empirical studies . . . demonstrate that the 
majority of taxpayers are inherently honest and willing to pay their 
share. If taxpayers are unable to understand the complex tax law and 
seek help from tax practitioners, they do it with the goal of preparing 
a correct tax file rather than finding aggressive strategies to reduce 
their taxes within the legal scope. 
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lower if taxpayers complied only when the risk of punishment made it 
financially advantageous to do so.78 Taxpayers seem particularly sensitive to 
perceptions about whether others are complying with tax laws.79 For example, 
simply sending a letter to taxpayers citing high rates of tax compliance in their 
jurisdiction has been found to increase reported income both above baseline 
and in comparison with letters warning of possible audits.80 
Tax compliance behavior is difficult to model because taxpayers vary 
greatly in their response to different circumstances. It might be helpful to think 
of the general population as consisting of three types of taxpayers: (1) those 
disposed to follow the law under almost all circumstances; (2) taxpayers who 
will cheat whenever they think doing so is worth the risk in straightforward 
financial terms; and (3) taxpayers who pay or evade taxes based on a variety 
of contextual factors including their perceptions of the behavior of other 
taxpayers and their general views about the fairness and legitimacy of the tax 
system. The variability of tax compliance in response to factors other than 
punishment suggests that the third category is quite large. Therefore, the 
important question is whether horizontal equity has an important influence on 
this third type of taxpayer. 
Although the results of laboratory experiments are not uniform, most 
studies have found that tax compliance increases with perceptions of 
horizontal equity and decreases when taxpayers perceive themselves to be 
treated differently from others who are similarly situated relative to the tax 
                                                     
 
ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 167 (2007) 
[hereinafter KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR]; see Alex 
Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 696 (2009) (“Clearly, not every taxpayer is a rational gamer 
straight out of Gary Becker’s model of crime and punishment. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the continuing emphasis on fines and audits has produced no apparent 
improvement in tax compliance.”). 
78. Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax 
Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 358 (1985) (“Application of the 
standard economic theory of crime to tax avoidance . . . produces an unambiguous 
prediction of behavior: throughout the 1970s no one should have paid the taxes they 
owed . . . .”). 
79. Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: the Case of Tax Compliance, 86 
Va. L. Rev. 1781, 1784 (2000) (“People are more likely to pay taxes if they believe 
that their friends and other citizens pay taxes.”). 
80. See Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance 
Experiment: State Tax Results, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE(Apr. 1996), 
http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats/research_reports/19xx/research_ 
reports_content_complnce.pdf. 
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base.81 Experimental subjects respond differently to tax increases and 
decreases depending on whether they violate horizontal equity.82 One 
experiment found that tax increases that fall equally on all members of a group 
and preserve horizontal equity do not tend to reduce compliance.83 However, 
tax increases that fall inequitably on different groups of taxpayers and thus 
increase horizontal inequity lead to lower rates of tax compliance. It appears 
                                                     
81. KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR, supra 
note 77, at 78. Multiple studies find that horizontal equity has a significant effect on 
tax compliance. Bernard Fortin et al., Tax Evasion and Social Interactions, 91 J. OF 
PUB. ECON. 2089 (2007) [hereinafter Fortin et al., Tax Evasion and Social 
Interactions]; Donald V. Moser et al., The Effects of Horizontal and Exchange Inequity 
on Tax Reporting Decisions, 70 ACCT. REV. 619 (1995) [hereinafter Moser et al., The 
Effects of Horizontal and Exchange Inequity]; Ana de Juan et al., Voluntary Tax 
Compliant Behavior of Spanish Income Tax Payers, 49 PUB. FIN. 90 (Supp. 1994); 
Michael W. Spicer, & Lee A. Becker, Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An 
Experimental Approach, 33 NAT’L TAX J. 171 (1980). One study, however, found a 
contrary result. Paul Webley, Henry Robben, & Ira Morris, Social Comparison, 
Attitudes and Tax Evasion in a Shop Simulation, 3 SOC. BEHAV. 219 (1988). 
82. Fortin et al., Tax Evasion and Social Interactions, supra note 81, at 
2107. 
 
We also find fairness effects in term of horizontal equity: for a given 
gross income and a given personal tax rate, the individual will report 
less when facing a reduction in the mean tax rate of his group. 
Perceived unfair taxation may thus lead to increased tax evasion. At 
the policy level this means that a taxation system that is more 
horizontally equitable is likely to improve tax compliance. 
 
Id. 
83. Moser et al., The Effects of Horizontal and Exchange Inequity, supra 
note 81, at 620. 
 
We find that, in the presence of horizontal inequity, subjects respond 
to an increase in exchange inequity (resulting from a tax-rate 
increase) by reporting less income . . . In contrast, in the presence of 
horizontal equity, subjects do not significantly change the amount 
of income they report as the tax rate increases. Subjects react less to 
the increase in exchange inequity associated with a tax-rate increase, 
apparently because they realize that all other taxpayers face the 
same tax-rate increase. Thus, in the presence of horizontal equity, 
the effect of the increased exchange inequity no longer dominates 
the effect of the economic incentives associated with a tax-rate 
increase. 
 
Id. 
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that, at least in the laboratory, people do tend to perceive horizontally equitable 
tax schemes as more fair and that this influences their behavior. There is some 
evidence for this effect outside of the laboratory as well. Surveys of Dutch 
entrepreneurs found that perceptions of fairness, including horizontal equity, 
were unrelated to intentions to comply with tax law for entrepreneurs with 
strong general personal dispositions to follow laws and moral rules, but 
appeared to have a significant impact on entrepreneurs who lack this general 
disposition.84 There is reason for caution in extrapolating these results. 
Laboratory settings allow for precise manipulations of variables, but it is 
unclear to what extent they simulate the behavior of taxpayers outside the lab. 
Furthermore, the effect of horizontal equity depends on public understanding 
of the Code and this is generally quite poor.85 It is likely that horizontal equity 
enhances the legitimacy of the Code and improves tax morale. The magnitude 
of this effect is more difficult to gauge. 
A somewhat speculative hypothesis about what explains this 
connection is that a substantial number of taxpayers are conditional 
cooperators.86 That is, they cooperate with the tax authorities if they think that 
others like them cooperate and that their tax burdens are relatively fair in light 
of what others like them pay. If not, they try to evade taxes. Almost nobody 
likes paying taxes, but most people realize that it is important to support public 
goods and are willing to do their part (albeit grudgingly, perhaps) if they are 
not singled out for especially burdensome treatment. Horizontal equity is 
important as a public signal that all taxpayers are making reasonable 
contributions to support public goods and tends to reassure taxpayers that they 
are not making grossly disproportionate sacrifices for the benefit of others. 
Reasonable contributions in this context, it should be emphasized, are not the 
same thing as whatever a taxpayer would require if she were to be able to 
                                                     
84. Peter Verboon & Sjoerd Goslinga, The Role of Fairness in Tax 
Compliance, 65 NETH. J. OF PSYCHOL. 136, 143 (2009). 
85. See generally KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX 
BEHAVIOUR, supra note 77, at 32–37. 
86. CHRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND 
DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 140–41 (2006). 
 
There is plenty of evidence that most people are conditional 
cooperators: They cooperate when they expect others to cooperate 
and defect otherwise. In other words, most people are neither pure 
altruists nor selfish brutes: They rather tend to condition their 
choices on what they expect other choosers to do, and, in cases in 
which such choices have a cost, they also take into account what 
others expect them to do. 
 
Id. 
2016] Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity 115 
unilaterally determine the tax laws.87 For conditional cooperators, avoiding 
results that leave some taxpayers feeling taken advantage of is more important 
than achieving results that are ideally fair. After all, most people do not have 
detailed views about ideal tax rates, deductions, and credits. However, they do 
tend to care when others do not do their part to support public goods. Free 
riders are never popular.88 If this hypothesis about the significance of 
horizontal equity is correct, it provides reason to favor taxes that are politically 
salient, at least when the Code is relatively horizontally equitable.89 For 
horizontal equity to function as a signal of tax fairness, taxpayers must be 
cognizant of at least the approximate structure and effect of the tax. 
Perhaps even more important than its role in legitimating taxation is 
horizontal equity’s role as a focal point for bargaining. Experience with 
comprehensive tax reform suggests that horizontal equity is an attractive 
compromise principle for ideologically disparate factions. The most important 
tax legislation in the United States during the past fifty years is the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act. Passage of the 1986 Act surprised most observers (including the 
special interest lobbyists whose job it was to stop it).90 The reform reflected a 
                                                     
87. And even in a horizontally equitable tax scheme, views about vertical 
equity may lead to some taxpayers regarding the Code as unfair. 
88. Evidence from experimental economics suggests that perceptions of 
free riding on the part of others have a pronounced negative effect on contributions to 
public goods. When given the opportunity to do so, people often are willing to sacrifice 
money to punish those who free ride in public goods games. The threat of punishment 
is often effective in maintaining high levels of contribution, but only in populations in 
which punishment of free riders is seen as legitimate. Conversely, when punishment 
of free riders is seen as illegitimate, it can backfire. See generally SAMUEL BOWLES & 
HERBERT GINTIS, A COOPERATIVE SPECIES: HUMAN RECIPROCITY AND ITS 
EVOLUTION 22–32 (2013). This psychology of “conditional cooperation” also has 
interesting implications for welfare policy. See Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare 
Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare 
Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000). 
89. David Gamage and Darien Shanske distinguish between economic 
salience and political salience. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on 
Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 24 (2011). 
The former relates to the impact of taxes on market behavior whereas the latter relates 
to their impact on political behavior. Gamage and Shanske are skeptical of arguments 
that democratic values provide reason to favor more politically salient taxes. Insofar 
as horizontal equity functions effectively as a signal of tax fairness, this provides an 
alternative justification for increasing political salience at least when taxes are 
relatively horizontally equitable. For example, income taxes might be preferable to 
VAT taxes in this respect. 
90. Prior to the 1986 Act, there was widespread pessimism about the 
prospects for reform. For example, in 1984, Michael Graetz wrote: 
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very simple general policy: elimination of exemptions, deductions, and credits 
expanded the tax base in order to finance the reduction of tax rates. This 
allowed both President Reagan and congressional Democrats to claim 
important victories. Reagan achieved a major goal in lowering tax rates in a 
context in which significant budget deficits made it very difficult to secure 
support for policies that would decrease tax revenue. Liberal reformers were 
able to close a large number of loopholes that mainly benefited large 
businesses and wealthy individuals. The reform was roughly revenue neutral, 
which meant that neither conservatives nor liberals could claim victory in their 
ongoing battle over the size of the federal government. Although elite opinion 
was squarely behind the reform, its improbable passage required overcoming 
opposition from the numerous interest groups that benefited from the pre-1986 
Code.91 
Horizontal equity was an explicit aim of the 1986 Act. Conlon, 
Wrightson, and Beam note that: 
 
[B]y the mid-1980s, most experts—including those within 
government—were in agreement on basic principles. 
According to the consensus, an ideal income tax should be 
horizontally equitable; it should be investment-neutral; and it 
should be administratively efficient. All three goals could be 
obtained by broadening the tax base and lowering rates.92 
 
Joseph Pechman, whose advocacy of tax reform provided much of the 
intellectual ballast, argued that reducing horizontal inequities should be a key 
                                                     
[P]rospects for structural tax reform have been dimmed by recent 
“reforms” in congressional practices; public pressure to enact 
income tax reforms seems nonexistent; political leadership on tax 
matters has become increasingly diffuse; committee deliberations 
are now open to the public and are well attended by representatives 
of groups with a special interest in the outcome; and political action 
committees now have great influence in guiding policy decisions. In 
short, for those who would urge massive tax reforms, there is more 
than ample cause for despair. 
 
Michael J. Graetz, Can the Income Tax Continue to be the Major Revenue Source? in 
OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 39, 42 (Joseph Pechman ed., 1984). 
91. See generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN 
AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX 
REFORM 13–19 (1987) [hereinafter BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI 
GULCH]. 
92. TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON & DAVID R. BEAM, 
TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 242 (1990). 
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objective of any comprehensive tax reform.93 In a 1982 speech proposing what 
became the basic framework for the 1986 tax reform, the reform’s key 
legislative architect, Senator Bill Bradley, advocated “a tax code in which all 
citizens with equal incomes are treated essentially the same way.”94 Thus, 
horizontal equity played two roles in the 1986 tax reform. First, it provided a 
focal point for compromise between a conservative White House and a more 
liberal Congress. Second, it provided an intuitive conception of tax fairness 
that was used to publicly justify the reform. Despite disagreements about the 
effects of the final reform package, even skeptics acknowledge that it did make 
some progress toward greater horizontal equity.95 In any case, the reform 
appears to have improved public impressions of the Code. Survey data from 
the late 1980s suggests that citizens viewed the Code as more fair after the 
1986 reform and were more willing to comply with tax law as a result.96 
This experience is not unique. Horizontal equity was a key goal of 
successful tax reform in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.97 Equitable 
treatment of different types of income was crucial for the successful 
introduction of income taxation in nineteenth century Great Britain. Robert 
Peel, who reestablished the income tax in 1841, was partially motivated by the 
promise of establishing “a sense of equity between different types of wealth 
and income.”98 Peel’s calculation appears to have been correct: the British state 
was able to raise more revenue with less political opposition in comparison 
both with its rivals on the continent and with its prior system of public 
                                                     
93. GEORGE F. BREAK & JOSEPH A PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE 
IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 5–6, 134–35 (1975). 
94. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH, supra note 91, 
at 23. 
95. E.g., Michael Graetz wrote: 
 
I would agree that the real merits of this legislation must be located 
in its improvements in tax equity, particularly in its promotion of 
greater ‘horizontal equity’ among taxpayers—the idea that people 
with similar incomes should pay similar amounts of tax. Once again, 
however, the achievements of the 1986 Act seem to have been 
exaggerated. 
 
Michael Graetz, The Truth About Tax Reform, 40 FLA. L. REV. 617, 629–30 (1988). 
96. Karyl A. Kinsey & Harold G. Grasmick, Did the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 Improve Tax Compliance? Three Studies of Pre- and Post-TRA Compliance 
Attitudes, 15 LAW & POL’Y 293, 318–20 (1993). 
97. CEDRIC SANDFORD, SUCCESSFUL TAX REFORM: LESSONS FROM AN 
ANALYSIS OF TAX REFORM IN SIX COUNTRIES 66, 73–74, 100–01, 154, 163 (1993). 
98. Martin Dounton, The Politics of British Taxation, in THE RISE OF 
FISCAL STATES: A GLOBAL HISTORY 1500–1914 111, 133 (Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, 
Patrick K. O’Brien & Granciso Comin ed.. 2012). 
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finance.99 The broader lesson is that tax policies that observe horizontal and 
vertical equity build public trust in the tax system and thus can help to create 
the conditions necessary for public support of social welfare spending and 
public investment. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Concern with horizontal equity may, at first blush, appear to be 
irrational if one rejects natural rights or moral desert accounts of property 
rights because it accords normative weight to market outcomes that have no 
particular moral significance. In a world with broad agreement on the 
normative and empirical questions germane to tax policy and a political system 
strong enough to implement the policies that this consensus implies, it would 
be sensible to determine taxes by considering the effects of various policies 
rather than their relation to patterns of pre-tax income. Under conditions of 
pervasive disagreement about relevant moral or factual matters, however, 
norms of tax fairness can play a valuable role in preventing disagreements 
about distributive questions from unsettling relative property entitlements 
fixed by private law. Proponents of differing ideologies can agree that it is 
desirable to avoid a wasteful patchwork of taxes and tax subsidies at any level 
of redistribution. Horizontal equity is best understood as requiring a sort of 
procedural fairness in allocating obligations to contribute to public goods. It 
provides a partial solution to the problem of how to assign tax obligations in 
the same way that “everyone gets to keep what they possess” provides a partial 
solution to the problem of control over resources. Because they appeal to long-
run interests of all parties, tax fairness norms can enable cooperation between 
persons with conflicting interests or differing values. 
This account of tax fairness shows why use of pre-tax income as a 
normative baseline is defensible even if one does not accept a natural rights 
theory of property. Preserving the relative holdings of similarly situated 
property owners constrains public policy in ways that are in the long-run 
interest of all citizens. Egalitarians can recognize this point without 
compromising their commitment to redistributive taxation because horizontal 
equity limits horizontal redistribution while leaving entirely open the question 
of how much downward distribution is appropriate. Conventional accounts of 
property rights and fairness norms thus provide a powerful rejoinder to 
Murphy and Nagel’s claim that horizontal equity is a manifestation of the 
“myth of ownership.” 
My defense of horizontal equity as a norm of conventional fairness is 
a modest one. It does not deny that there is also a role for more ambitious 
theories of just taxation including egalitarian theories of the sort endorsed by 
Murphy and Nagel or utilitarian theories of the sort endorsed by Louis Kaplow. 
                                                     
99. Id. at 141–42. 
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It is consistent with my theory that if someone has the power to enact a 
complete set of tax laws, that person might ignore horizontal and vertical 
equity in favor of her favorite comprehensive theory of justice. One can 
endorse horizontal equity as a principle of non-ideal tax fairness while 
remaining a utilitarian, a Rawlsian, or a neo-Lockean on the level of ideal 
theory. Even if horizontal equity is a useful principle of fairness under some 
circumstances, this does not necessarily mean that it is the only way to 
constrain opportunistic use of the power to tax or to secure compromise over 
tax policy. I have not considered alternative means of constraining systems of 
taxation to prevent wasteful resource conflict.100 However, given the 
difficulties of enacting tax reform against a background of pervasive 
ideological discord and a foreground of well-organized special interests, we 
need all the tools that we can get. Horizontal equity is defensible as a matter 
of principle and, if not dismissed as simple-minded or outdated, could once 
again play an important role in improving our system of taxation. 
 
                                                     
100. One approach, advocated by James Buchanan, uses a unanimity rule to 
guarantee adoption of a package of taxes and spending measures that leaves all 
taxpayers better off. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY 46–
68 (1975). This approach has the advantage of including both taxation and public 
expenditure in the same analytical framework. It tends, however, to be hostile to 
redistributive taxation and thus is far more ideologically fraught than the more modest 
principle of horizontal equity defended here. And, in any case, it is unclear how to 
implement policies approximating the unanimity criterion in a way that preserves its 
virtues without allowing irrational holdouts or hardball negotiators to block essential 
spending. 
